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Abstract
In commonplace text-based password schemes, users typically choose passwords that are easy to recall,
exhibit patterns, and are thus vulnerable to brute-force dictionary attacks. This leads us to ask whether
other types of passwords (e.g., graphical) are also vulnerable to dictionary attack due to users tending to
choose memorable passwords. We suggest a method to predict and model a number of such classes for
systems where passwords are created solely from a user’s memory. We hypothesize that these classes deﬁne
weak password subspaces suitable for an attack dictionary. For user-drawn graphical passwords, we apply
this method with cognitive studies on visual recall. These cognitive studies motivate us to deﬁne a set of
password complexity factors (e.g., reﬂective symmetry and stroke-count), which deﬁne a set of classes. To
better understand the size of these classes, and thus how weak the password subspaces they deﬁne might be,
we use the “Draw-A-Secret” (DAS) graphical password scheme of Jermyn et al. (1999) as an example. We
analyze the size of these classes for DAS under convenient parameter choices, and show that they can be
combined to deﬁne apparently popular subspaces that have bit-sizes ranging from 31 to 41 – a surprisingly
small proportion of the full password space (58 bits). Our results quantitatively support suggestions that
user-drawn graphical password systems employ measures such as graphical password rules or guidelines, and
proactive password checking.
1. INTRODUCTION
The ubiquitous use of text-based passwords for user authentication has a well-known weakness: users tend
to choose passwords with predictable characteristics, related to how easy they are to remember. This often
means passwords which have “meaning” to the user. Unfortunately, many of these “higher probability”
passwords fall into a tiny subset of the full password space. We refer to such subsets as weak password
subspaces (we deﬁne this more formally in Section 2.1).
Ideally, users would choose passwords equi-probably from a large subset of the overall password space, to
increase the cost of a dictionary attack, i.e., a brute-force guessing attack involving candidate guesses from
a prioritized list of “likely passwords”. If a password scheme’s probability distribution is non-uniform, its
entropy is reduced. In Klein’s case study [1990], 25% of 14000 user passwords were found in a dictionary
of only 3 × 106 words; the Morris Worm [Spaﬀord 1989] used a dictionary of only 432 words in addition to
the 1988 UNIX online dictionary (about 25000 words [Spaﬀord 1992]) with remarkable success: some sites
reported that 50% of passwords were correctly guessed. This suggests that a password scheme’s security is
linked more closely to the size of its weak password subspaces than that of the full password space (which,
e.g., for 8-character passwords of digits and mixed-case letters, is about 2 × 1014).
Graphical password schemes (e.g., [Jermyn et al. 1999; Wiedenbeck et al. 2005; Dhamija and Perrig 2000;
Real User Corporation 2004]) require users to remember picture-based information instead of text, motivated
in part by the fact that humans have a remarkable capability to remember pictures. If the number of
possible pictures is suﬃciently large, and the diversity of picture-based passwords can be captured, graphical
passwords may be less susceptible to having weak password subspaces and oﬀer better security. Since
graphical password systems have not been widely deployed to date, we lack knowledge of the distribution
of the sort of pictures people are likely to select as graphical passwords. To this end, we propose models
(which turn out to be supported by other user studies) to predict and characterize user choice in graphical
password systems in which passwords are created solely from the user’s memory without any other visual
cues. Examples of such graphical passwords include free-form user-drawn graphical password schemes (e.g.,
DAS [Jermyn et al. 1999], variations such as Pass-Go [Tao 2006]), and schemes whereby a user might create
1Version: June 2, 2007. Preliminary versions of parts of this paper appeared as [Thorpe and van Oorschot 2004a] and [Thorpe
and van Oorschot 2004b].2  
a graphical password by dragging and dropping basic shapes. We thus refer to such systems as user-drawn
graphical password systems.
As mentioned, the high success rate of brute-force dictionary attacks against text-based passwords is
believed to be strongly related to the recall capabilities of humans and how this aﬀects password selection:
meaningful and thus more easily remembered strings are frequently chosen. This leads one to ask whether
other types of passwords (e.g., graphical) are also vulnerable to dictionary attack due to users’ tendencies
to choose memorable passwords. For relatively new password schemes where there is an absence of large
datasets from diverse populations, we are motivated by the questions: (1) How might an attacker build a
dictionary? (2) How successful would a brute-force dictionary attack using such a dictionary be?
Under conjecture that available studies from research on human memory might reveal higher-probability
password choices, we provide a general predictive method for modelling and deﬁning weak password subspaces
in Section 2.1. We apply this method to user-drawn graphical passwords, and use these subspaces to build a
graphical dictionary (i.e., an attack dictionary against a graphical password scheme). We expect that a clever
attacker would prioritize a graphical dictionary according to how easy pictures or picture elements in the
password are to recall or recognize, based on evidence from similar or related contexts. To ﬁnd complexity
properties that an attacker might use to deﬁne weak password subspaces for a graphical dictionary, and since
our focus is on user-drawn graphical password schemes that require pure recall on the part of the user, we
review cognitive studies indicating the types of images people are most likely to recall. We introduce a set of
user-drawn graphical password complexity properties, including: password length, number of components,
and symmetry. We model what we conjecture to be classes of higher-probability user-drawn graphical
passwords based on these complexity properties.
To apply our classes to a real graphical password scheme, we use “Draw-A-Secret” (DAS) [Jermyn et al.
1999] as an example, as it has a large full password space, implicitly suggesting it is free of weak password
subspaces. We apply two of our conjectured classes of higher-probability user-drawn graphical passwords
(individually and combined) to DAS as candidate weak password subspaces. We ﬁnd that these classes for
DAS are small enough to be computationally exhausted, thus if their probability is high as implied by the
motivating visual memory studies (and supported by user studies2), they would appear to be weak password
subspaces. Under convenient parameter choices, where the size of the full DAS password space is 58 bits,
the size of these combined classes is surprisingly small - 31 to 41 bits.
Our Contributions. For new password schemes, we introduce a method to predictively model weak
password subspaces. For user-drawn graphical password schemes, our contributions include: the applica-
tion of our predictive modelling method to user-drawn graphical passwords, the identiﬁcation of user-drawn
graphical password complexity properties, the deﬁnition of two broad subspaces of weak user-drawn graph-
ical passwords, and the introduction of graphical dictionaries. We analyze the size of two weak password
subspaces, and discuss what counter-measures can increase security. Our results naturally lead to password
rules for user-drawn graphical passwords and motivate the use of proactive graphical password checkers.
We propose a preliminary set of user-drawn graphical password rules motivated by our analysis, the most
signiﬁcant of which is to increase the stroke-count (in schemes where the input order matters).
Organization. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a predictive
method to model weak password subspaces, presents a complexity model for user-drawn graphical passwords,
provides an overview of attacker strategies, and deﬁnes classes of weak user-drawn graphical passwords. As
an example, Section 3 explains applying our graphical dictionaries to DAS. Section 4 presents our results
and analysis of the security of DAS; the most compelling results are given in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. Section 5
summarizes user studies (by others) whose results support that our classes are indeed weak password sub-
spaces. Section 6 discusses methods to increase user-drawn graphical password security (including practical
considerations). Section 7 brieﬂy discusses related work. Section 8 provides concluding remarks.
2. PREDICTIVE METHOD AND PASSWORD COMPLEXITY MODEL
Since text-based password dictionaries focus on words people recall better, we are lead to consider how
this might apply to dictionaries for other password schemes (e.g., graphical) for which we lack knowledge
of the distribution of user choice. In Section 2.1, we introduce a predictive method as a starting point for
2Our conjectures that studies of visual memory from other contexts might predict higher-probability password subspaces are
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modelling user choice. Here we apply this predictive method to user-drawn graphical password systems
(gud-passwords).
We assume that users will choose gud-passwords that minimize their complexity, therefore we model
memorable (and thus higher-probability) gud-passwords as those that have low complexity. Motivated by
cognitive studies on visual recall (see Section 2.2), we introduce a set of gud-password complexity properties:
password length, number of components (i.e., the visually distinct parts of the password), symmetry, and
number of turns in each component. In this paper, we focus on all but the latter. Section 2.3 introduces
a user-drawn graphical password complexity model, and Section 2.4 discusses attacker strategy to build a
graphical dictionary using this model.
2.1 Predictive Method
We suggest the following general predictive method for modelling user choice in memory-based authentication
schemes:
(1) Identify the tasks required from users during login, and what type of demand this places on their memory
(e.g., verbal recall, visual recall, recall of input order).
(2) Determine what relevant information is available about user’s memory (possibly from other contexts)
regarding these identiﬁed demands.
(3) Identify password complexity properties based on this information. We informally deﬁne a password
complexity property to be a characteristic that aﬀects password memorability (and by conjecture, the
chance of selection by users).
(4) Use these properties to model classes of memorable passwords.
(5) Estimate the size of these classes; any computationally exhaustible subset of the password space is a
candidate weak password subspace (see Deﬁnition 1).
Deﬁnition 1 (Weak password subspace). A weak password subspace is a subset W of a password space
P that exhibits the following three properties:
(1) (Smallness of W). |W| ≤ te, where te is a threshold number of passwords that may be tested within an
adversary’s computational resources and environment.
(2) (Signiﬁcance of W).
P
wi∈W p(wi) ≥ α, where α is an upper bound on the “tolerable” probability of a
password compromise (over a period of time commensurate with the resource expenditure in 1).3
(3) (Generability of W). W has deﬁning characteristics that allow generation of all of its passwords.
Informally, a weak password is any password that falls within a weak password subspace. Weak passwords
are similarly informally deﬁned by Spaﬀord [1992].
Weak password subspaces are a general concept which extend beyond graphical passwords; informally,
they are subsets (of a space of secrets) whose elements are more easily guessed. Other examples of this
concept include weak keys in symmetric cryptosystems [Daemen et al. 1993], weak RSA primes (e.g., see
[Menezes et al. 2001]), and text password dictionaries [Openwall Project 2004a].
It follows from Deﬁnition 1 that for a scheme to be free of weak password subspaces, it is necessary for it
to have a large total space; however, this is not suﬃcient due to what an attacker might be able to predict
about user choice. Diﬀerent systems can tolerate diﬀerent levels of risk; this is captured by the parameter
α which represents the tolerable probability for an attacker’s success. For example, a user might feel that it
is tolerable for an attacker to have a probability 2−10 of compromising their password, whereas government
and banking servers might require a probability of at most 2−30.
2.2 Relevant Memory Studies
We focus on user-drawn graphical passwords, where a user’s login task involves pure visual recall of a drawn
image, and recall of the temporal order (i.e., how the image was drawn). Following step (2) of the predictive
method in Section 2.1, we examine and discuss a collection of relevant cognitive studies on visual recall.
3This condition is naturally related to that of entropy [Shannon 1948].4  
Generally, free recall is ordered along the concreteness continuum: concrete words are recalled more easily
than abstract words, pictures more easily than concrete words, and objects better than pictures [Madigan
1983]. Various studies support this result (e.g., [Kirkpatrick 1894; Calkins 1898; Madigan and Lawrence
1980]). Another study [Bower et al. 1975] found that a series of line drawings is poorly remembered if the
subject is unable to interpret the drawings in a meaningful way. The more concrete a drawing, the more
meaningful it will be to the viewer.
Patterns in what types of images people recall better than others could be used to create classes of
memorable and thus weak passwords, if such classes are suﬃciently small.
There appears to be little existing research that examines the types of pictures people recall better. How-
ever, one cognitive study with interesting implications showed experimentally how visual recall progressively
changed over time toward a symmetric version of the image [Perkins 1932]. Given a set of asymmetrical,
geometric images, when test subjects were asked to draw the image from recall, all changes made from the
originals were in the direction of some balanced or symmetrical pattern. This change was progressive over
time toward a symmetric pattern. That people recall images as increasingly symmetric with time suggests
to us that people prefer images that are symmetric.
A representative overview of literature for human symmetry perception [Tyler 1996] notes that many
objects in our environment are symmetric. There is also signiﬁcant evidence [Wagemans 1996] that mirror
symmetry has a special status in human perception over other symmetry types such as repetition, translation
or rotational symmetry, which were found to require scrutiny; in contrast, mirror symmetry is “eﬀortless,
rapid, and spontaneous” [Tyler 1996].
The classical studies mentioned above found better recall for pictures than words, and better recall for
objects than pictures. If people recall objects best, and most objects are mirror symmetric, this suggests that
people may recall mirror symmetric patterns best. This is supported by an observation by Attneave [1955]:
when subjects were given random patterns and symmetric patterns of dots, the symmetric ones were more
accurately reproduced than random patterns with the same number of dots. Attneave theorized that this
may indicate that some perceptual mechanism is capable of organizing or encoding the redundant pattern
into a simpler, more compact, less redundant form. In a separate study, French [1954] observed that dot
patterns that were symmetric were more easily remembered. Intuitively, this is no surprise – in the case of
mirror symmetry, a subject must only recall half of the image and its reﬂection axis in order to reconstruct
the entire image.
Mirror symmetry has a special meaning to human visual perception, particularly when the axis is about
the vertical and horizontal planes. Mirror symmetry has been found to be more easily perceived as having
meaning when it is about the vertical axis, followed by when it is about the horizontal axis [Wagemans 1996].
Note that most living organisms and plants, as well as almost all forms of human construction are mirror
symmetric (reﬂective) about a vertical axis.
Attneave’s [1957] ﬁndings of shape complexity also imply that people are better at recalling a low number
of components. The following studies imply that values of “low” might lie between 3 and 8. Vogel and
Machizawa [2004] found neurophysiological evidence that the human visual short term memory is limited to
3-4 symbols. Similar values were obtained for the number of dots recalled in grids of diﬀerent sizes (recall
decreased signiﬁcantly after 3 or 4 dots) [Ichikawa 1982]. Alternately, French [1954] found that people have
optimal memory for dot patterns containing 6 to 8 dots.
2.3 Model Motivated by Studies
Motivated by these collective studies, we propose the following.
Conjecture 1 Since people are more likely to recall symmetric images and patterns, and people perceive
mirror symmetry as having a special status, a signiﬁcant subset of users are likely to choose mirror symmetric
patterns as gud-passwords.
More speciﬁcally, we propose that the mirror symmetric patterns chosen are more likely to be about vertical
or horizontal axes. For gud-passwords, this leads us to deﬁne a Class 1 password (Deﬁnition 3). Findings
that people are more likely to recall a low number of components (Deﬁnition 2) leads us to Conjecture 2 and
to deﬁne a Class 2 password (Deﬁnition 4).
Deﬁnition 2 (component). A component is a visually distinct part of an image.  5
For example, a component in DAS is a drawn stroke. As another example, for a scheme wherein the user
creates a password by dragging and dropping basic shapes, a component is a dragged/dropped shape.
Deﬁnition 3 (Class 1 password). A Class 1 password (C1-password) is a gud-password that exhibits
mirror symmetry about a vertical or horizontal axis in its components. Thus each component is either
mirror symmetric in its own right, or is part of a pair of components that are mirror symmetric images of
each other.
Conjecture 2 Since people are likely to only recall a small number (between 3 and 8) of symbols, a signiﬁcant
subset of users are likely to choose gud-passwordswith a small number of components.
Deﬁnition 4 (Class 2 password). A Class 2 password (C2-password) is a gud-password with a small
number 3 ≤ c ≤ 8 of components.
The Class 1 password space is composed of the set of encoded representations of C1-passwords; these form
a graphical dictionary (i.e., a Class 1 graphical dictionary). Class 2 password space and Class 2 graphical
dictionary are deﬁned analogously.
2.4 Attack Strategy and Deﬁning Graphical Dictionaries
There are two main attack strategies that an adversary can follow when trying to crack passwords: attacking
a speciﬁc user account, or attacking a system by guessing the passwords for some larger set of (e.g., random)
accounts. If the probability distribution for user choice within the password space is known, one can estimate
the expected number of guesses for a speciﬁc user password using statistical expectation, or estimate the
number of guesses required to guess a password on a system by using entropy (see [Massey 1994]). We use
neither approach since in general, we do not know these probabilities.4
If C1-passwords and C2-passwords are signiﬁcantly more probable in practice as we conjecture, the prob-
ability distribution of the graphical password space of gud-password schemes is highly non-uniform, signiﬁ-
cantly reducing the entropy of the password space. Similarly, the entropy is adversely aﬀected if users favor
passwords with characteristics that deﬁne other relatively small subsets of the full password space. We deﬁne
graphical dictionaries for guessing attacks based on various subsets of passwords later in this section.
A clever attacker doing a brute-force guessing attack would prioritize candidate password guesses according
to their probability of being chosen. We believe our graphical dictionaries would be the basis of such an
ordering. We suggest that a clever attacker may prioritize a multi-class graphical dictionary according to
passwords with an increasing number of components, and belonging to our classes as follows:
(1) Class 1 ∩ Class 2,
(2) Class 2 − (Class 1 ∩ Class 2),
(3) Class 1 − (Class 1 ∩ Class 2),
(4) Full password space − (Class 1 ∪ Class 2)
Each class might also be internally prioritized as discussed in their respective sections, below.
2.4.1 Class 1 Dictionaries. A logical way to prioritize the Class 1 dictionary is to assume that it is
more likely for a user to choose a single reﬂection axis, or reﬂection axes that are close together. If an
image’s components are symmetric about axes that are far apart (e.g., Fig. 1a), the image does not appear
to be symmetric as a whole; we say such images are locally symmetric. When an image’s components
are symmetric about axes that are close together (e.g., Fig. 1b), it is increasingly symmetric as a whole,
producing an image that is pseudo-symmetric. When all components of an image are symmetric about the
same axis (e.g., Fig. 1c), it produces an image that is symmetric as a whole (i.e., globally symmetric). The
set of globally symmetric passwords best captures the symmetry discussed in Section 2.2, and our intuition
suggests that global symmetry (Fig. 1c) is more likely than pseudo-symmetry (Fig. 1b), which is more likely
than local symmetry (Fig. 1a).
This leads us to deﬁne sub-classes of Class 1, based on the number of axes that the image’s components are
symmetric about. If it turns out that global symmetry is more likely than pseudo-symmetry, an attacker may
4However, see Section 5 for some data points from one large user study.6  
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(b) Pseudo−symmetry (c) Global symmetry (a) Local symmetry
Fig. 1. Example Class 1 DAS passwords containing the same components, symmetric about diﬀerent patterns of
axes: (a) 3 diﬀerent, scattered axes, (b) 3 diﬀerent, nearby axes, and (c) a single axis.
place passwords that are composed of components symmetric about the center-most axes at a higher priority
in the graphical dictionary. Additionally, for user-drawn schemes (e.g., DAS), if the user subconsciously uses
the input area to frame the drawing (i.e., using the grid as part of the drawing’s overall symmetry), the
resulting drawings would be symmetric about the center-most axes.
Deﬁnition 5 (Class 1a). Class 1a is the subset of passwords in Class 1 that use only the center 3 of each
set of horizontal or vertical axes (e.g., the marked axes in Fig. 2), producing pseudo-symmetric images.
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Fig. 2. Class 1a reﬂection axes for the DAS scheme. The thickest axes are the vertical and horizontal center axes.
Adjacent axes are marked as thinner.
Deﬁnition 6 (Class 1b). Class 1b is the subset of passwords in Class 1 that use only the center of each
set of horizontal or vertical axes, producing globally symmetric images.
Class 1b captures all passwords that are globally symmetric and centered about the grid (vertically and/or
horizontally), plus those that have components symmetric about the center vertical and horizontal axes (e.g.,
the coﬀee cup in Fig. 3).
Class 1b is a subset of Class 1a, which is a subset of Class 1. We expect that an attacker would order
Class 1b passwords ﬁrst in a Class 1 graphical dictionary, followed by the remaining Class 1a passwords, and
ﬁnally the remaining passwords in Class 1.
2.4.2 Class 2 Dictionaries. An obvious attack strategy for Class 2 graphical dictionaries is to prioritize
based on the number of components, in increasing order. A dictionary attack would thus try all entries with
one component, then two, etc. Given the evidence to show a threshold number of 3 or 4 components is more
memorable (recall Section 2.2), we focus on those C2-passwords with c = 4 for our model. An attacker with
a particular account in mind might expand a dictionary to also consider larger values of c.  7
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Fig. 3. Example of a Class 1b DAS drawing. One component (the handle) is symmetric about the center horizontal
axis, and another (the cup), is symmetric about the center vertical axis.
2.4.3 Class 3, 4, and 5 Dictionaries. Here we mention three additional classes of graphical dictionaries.
User-drawn passwords in the form of alphanumeric symbols are considered by Tao [2006]; we suggest calling
this Class 3. We identify Class 4 passwords and Class 5 passwords based on repetitive and rotational
symmetry respectively. These are common types of symmetry, although according to cognitive studies they
do not hold the same special status as mirror symmetry. We note that these classes (and possibly many
others) might also be placed in a graphical dictionary. We do not pursue further details in this paper.
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(a) Repetitive symmetry (b) Rotational symmetry
Fig. 4. Example Class 4 and Class 5 DAS passwords.
3. APPLYING GRAPHICAL DICTIONARIES TO DAS
As an example of applying our methods, and to augment the original (and to our knowledge the only
previous) security evaluation of DAS [Jermyn et al. 1999], we determine the size of the more probable
subsets of the DAS Class 1 and Class 2 password spaces of Section 2.3, i.e., the number of encoded DAS
passwords representing at least one Class 1 (respectively Class 2) password. This is based on the reasoning
that the number of entries in a “successful” attack dictionary provides a measure of (in)security.
The DAS graphical password scheme relies on a user’s ability to recall their DAS password “exactly” (as
deﬁned by the resolution of the encoding scheme). For this analysis, we only consider passwords that are
allowed within DAS (see Section 3.1). What users must recall can be divided into two parts: the temporal
order and number of strokes used in the drawing, and the ﬁnal appearance of the drawing. C1-passwords
consider the latter, and C2-passwords partially consider the former (a user must recall an increasing amount
of temporal order information with an increasing number of components).
Assumptions concerning the temporal order of C1-passwords in DAS (i.e., the order of the input of cells)
are made in Section 3.2 for our analysis, leading us to deﬁne the set S1 (Deﬁnition 12). In order to map
C1-passwords to DAS, we must discuss these assumptions about temporal order: Section 3.2.1 discusses our
terminology and general approach, and Section 3.2.2 discusses additional cases. Section 3.3 discusses the
mapping of C2-passwords to DAS, leading us to deﬁne the set S2 (Deﬁnition 14).8  
3.1 Review of DAS
DAS encompasses both a general idea – user drawings as passwords – and a speciﬁc grid-based method
to implement that idea (i.e., the encoding that maps a user drawing into an exactly repeatable password)
[Jermyn et al. 1999; Monrose 1999]. To distinguish these concepts, we will refer to the speciﬁc encoding
scheme of Jermyn et al. as DASJ, and hereafter reserve the term DAS for the general idea. DASJ decouples
the position of password input from the temporal order, producing a larger password space than text-based
password schemes with keyboard input (where the order in which characters are typed predetermines their
position).
A DAS password is a simple picture drawn on a G×G grid. Each grid cell is denoted by two-dimensional
coordinates (x,y) ∈ [1...G] × [1...G]. For DASJ, an encoded password is a sequence of coordinate pairs
listing the cells through which the drawing passes, in the order in which it passes through them. Each time
the pen is lifted from the grid surface, this “pen-up” event is represented by the distinguished coordinate
pair (G + 1,G + 1). Two drawings having the same encoding (i.e., crossing the same sequence of grid cells
with pen-up events in the same places in the sequence) are considered equivalent.5 Drawings are divided
into equivalence classes in this manner.
DASJ disallows passwords considered diﬃcult to repeat exactly (e.g., passwords involving user input lying
close to a grid boundary). The deﬁnition of “close to a grid boundary” is imprecise [Jermyn et al. 1999]; we
deﬁne it as any part of a stroke for which the cell(s) it lies within is indiscernible, meaning it lies within the
fuzzy region surrounding a grid line. Any stroke is invalid if it starts or ends in a fuzzy region, or if it crosses
through the fuzzy region near the intersection of grid lines. We reuse the following terminology.
—The neighbors N(x,y) of cell (x,y) are (x − 1,y),(x + 1,y),(x,y − 1) and (x,y + 1).
—A stroke is a sequence of cells {ci}, in which ci ∈ Nci−1 and which is void of a pen-up.
—A DASJ password is a sequence of strokes separated by pen-ups.
—The length of a stroke is the number of coordinate pairs it contains.
—The length of a DASJ password is the sum of the lengths of its strokes (excluding pen-ups).
Jermyn et al. [1999] recursively compute the (full) password space size, i.e., the number of distinct encoded
graphical passwords in DASJ. This gives an upper bound on the size of weak password subspaces and thus
on the security of the scheme. It is assumed that all passwords of total length greater than some ﬁxed value
have probability zero. They compute the full password space size for passwords of total length at most Lmax.
For Lmax = 12 and a 5 × 5 grid, this is 258, exceeding the number of text-based passwords of 8 characters
or fewer constructed from the printable ASCII codes (
P8
i=1 95i < 253).
3.2 Class 1 DASJ Graphical Dictionaries
In this section we describe how we map the visual mirror symmetry from Class 1 to DASJ passwords. Our
general approach and additional cases are described in Section 3.2.1 and Section 3.2.2 respectively, leading
us to deﬁne our mapping from Class 1 to DASJ in Section 3.2.3.
3.2.1 Basic Terminology and General Approach. Our approach is to model each Class 1 password in
DASJ as a series of strokes (each representing a single component or pair of components; recall Deﬁnition
3) drawn using only symmetric strokes (Deﬁnition 8. Each such stroke is modelled by a deﬁning stroke from
virtual start point s = (x,y) to virtual end point e = (x,y). We enumerate all possible values of s and e for
each reﬂection axis, using these values as a model of the symmetry, and then consider the ways the resulting
(user-drawn) stroke might be drawn. We emphasize that s and e are used to model the symmetry, and are
not necessarily the start and end points of the user-drawn stroke.
To capture mirror symmetric DASJ passwords, we ﬁrst consider which reﬂection axes to use. We assume
that the user references the grid lines for the symmetry in the drawing, since if the reﬂection axis is a point
of reference, the password will be easier to repeat exactly. Therefore, the reﬂection axes considered are those
that cut a set of grid cells (Fig. 5a), or are on a grid line (Fig. 5b). This means that any symmetric password
drawn such that its axis is oﬀ-center within a set of cells is not considered. For example, the password in
Fig. 6a is visually symmetric when the grid is not in place, but we do not consider it part of the set of Class
1 passwords in DASJ since its reﬂection axis is not on a grid line or centered in a set of cells as shown in
5This implies a many-to-one mapping of user drawings to encoded DASJ passwords.  9
Fig. 6b. We justify this assumption as follows: it is more diﬃcult for a user to draw an exactly repeatable
symmetric password without a visible point of reference on the grid for the reﬂection axis.
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(b) (a)
Fig. 5. Possible axes can (a) cut a set of cells; or (b) be on a grid line between sets of cells.
We thus deﬁne the set of axes within a W × H grid (width W, height H): A = Ah ∪ Av; Ah =
{1,1.5,2,...,(H − 1).5,H}; Av = {1,1.5,2,...,(W − 1).5,W}. Here i.5 is the grid line separating rows
i and i + 1, or columns i and i + 1 respectively.
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Fig. 6. Drawing that is symmetric about a diﬃcult to reference axis. Assuming the v is drawn before the dot, the
encoding of (b) is (2,2), (3,2), (3,3), (3,2), pen-up, (3,2), pen-up. If shifted slightly right to be symmetric about the
vertical axis x = 3, it has symmetric encoding: (3,2), (3,3), (3,2), pen-up, (3,2), pen-up.
Deﬁnition 7 (symmetric area). The symmetric area (given a reﬂection axis a), is the area between a
and the closest grid boundary parallel to a, reﬂected about a (see Fig. 7).
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Fig. 7. Example symmetric areas for (a) the axis x = 1; and (b) x = 2.5
One way to draw a symmetric stroke is to draw a stroke within the symmetric area (possibly crossing over
the reﬂection axis), then draw its reﬂection about the reﬂection axis as shown in Fig. 9a. We call the initial10  
stroke from virtual start point s to virtual end point e that the reﬂection is based upon the deﬁning stroke,
and the reﬂection the reﬂected stroke, which can be drawn from sR (the reﬂection of s) to eR (the reﬂection
of e) or vice versa. When the deﬁning stroke is drawn from e to s, we consider (and count) it a diﬀerent
deﬁning stroke, since input order is relevant in DASJ.
Deﬁnition 8 (symmetric stroke). A symmetric stroke is a stroke (or pair of strokes) drawn such that it
follows one of the disjoint case, continuous case, or closed case (per Deﬁnitions 9, 10, and 11). For context,
see Fig. 8. Whether actually drawn as a single stroke or pair of strokes, it is modelled by the combined result
of a deﬁning stroke and a reﬂected stroke about an axis a, remaining within the bounds of the symmetric
area deﬁned by a.
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Fig. 8. Example DASJ password that is in Class 1, but is not drawn in symmetric strokes.
Deﬁnition 9 (disjoint case). The disjoint case consists of two user-drawn strokes holding the property
of exact reﬂection. Given a deﬁning stroke z, its reﬂected stroke zR (relative to an axis a) is said to be an
exact reﬂection if zR is z’s mirror image about a and they are separated by a pen-up.
As a stroke pair that falls within the disjoint case has the property of exact reﬂection, its length will always
be even. The product of the number of ways to draw a deﬁning stroke and the number of ways to draw its
reﬂected stroke provides the number of ways to draw that stroke in the disjoint case (eﬀectively counting
each way to draw the reﬂected stroke for each way to draw the deﬁning stroke). The disjoint case is not the
only type of symmetric stroke (see Section 3.2.2).
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Fig. 9. Disjoint and Continuous Cases. Symmetric strokes consist of a deﬁning stroke (solid line from s to e) and
reﬂected stroke (solid line from s
R to e
R). The last two, visually representing the letter ‘U’, show continuous cases
where: (b) the axis cuts a set of cells; and (c) the axis is on a grid line.  11
3.2.2 Continuous and Closed Cases. A point p = (x,y) in an encoded deﬁning stroke is potentially
continuous if it denotes a cell that is either cut by the reﬂection axis a in question, or adjacent to a when a
is on a grid line. If p is potentially continuous, its reﬂection pR is in the same cell as p or in a neighboring
cell, and thus the stroke can be drawn directly from p to pR without a pen-up. When the start and end
points of a deﬁning stroke are potentially continuous, the three most apparently straightforward ways to
draw the resulting symmetric stroke are as follows: disjointly, as one continuous stroke, or as one continuous
closed stroke (see Deﬁnitions 9, 10, and 11).
A symmetric stroke can be drawn as a continuous case when the deﬁning stroke’s end point is potentially
continuous.
Deﬁnition 10 (continuous case). The continuous case consists of one user-drawn stroke, whereby the
deﬁning stroke continues through the axis to the reﬂected stroke, in a single, continuous stroke.
For example, the encoding for Fig. 9b would be: (1,1), (1,2), (1,3), (1,4), (2,4), (3,4), (4,4), (5,4), (5,3),
(5,2), (5,1), ending with a pen-up. The stroke could also be drawn in the reverse order. Examples of the
same visual representation of a ‘U’, with one disjoint and the other continuous, are shown in Figures 9a and
b. Note that the continuous case’s encoding is diﬀerent, depending on whether the axis a cuts a set of cells
or is on a grid line. If a cuts a set of cells as in Fig. 9b, the deﬁning stroke’s endpoint e is the same as its
reﬂection eR. Since there is no pen-up to separate e from eR, it cannot appear in the encoding twice, thus
eR does not appear in the resulting encoding. If a is on a grid line (Fig. 9c), e and eR reside in diﬀerent
cells, and both e and eR appear in the resulting encoding.
A symmetric stroke can be drawn as a closed case when both the deﬁning stroke’s start and end points
are potentially continuous (e.g., Fig. 10).
Deﬁnition 11 (closed case). The closed case consists of one user-drawn stroke, whereby the deﬁning
stroke continues through the reﬂection axis to the reﬂected stroke, and then ends up back in the same cell as
the start of the deﬁning stroke, essentially creating a closed shape. When a drawing is closed, the user-drawn
stroke may start and end at any point in the shape (e.g., Fig. 10a).
As with the continuous case, the closed case’s encoding is diﬀerent, depending on whether the axis a cuts
a set of cells or is on a grid line. The continuation of the deﬁning stroke into the reﬂected stroke will be
encoded as in the continuous case; the diﬀerence between these two cases is the encoding to join the reﬂected
stroke back into the deﬁning stroke. When a is on a grid line, the start point of the deﬁning stroke is repeated
as the last point of the user-drawn stroke (e.g., Fig. 10b). When a cuts a set of cells (e.g., Fig. 10a), it is
the same as the continuous case since s = sR, enclosing the shape. Thus, to avoid double-counting, we must
(and do) exclude the cases where s is potentially continuous from the continuous case. Note that when the
deﬁning stroke (completely) repeats over itself is counted by this case; this is included when the deﬁning
stroke is a closed case itself. Cases where the closed case only partially repeats over itself (e.g., only a few
cells) are not considered a symmetric stroke.
4
3
2
1
1 2 3 4
s
e
(b)
5
4
3
2
1
1 2 3 4 5
e
(a)
s
Fig. 10. Diﬀerent types of the closed case. The reﬂection axis in (a) cuts a set of cells, and (b) is on a grid line. Case
(a) shows all possible user-drawn start/end points in the symmetric stroke modelled by s and e.12  
3.2.3 Classes S1, S1a, and SIb . The deﬁnition of C1-passwords takes into account only their ﬁnal visual
appearance. There is a one-to-many relationship between a given C1-password and the number of ways it
can be drawn in the DASJ scheme (which are then mapped to possibly fewer unique DASJ encodings). We
believe there are some more likely ways that users will draw mirror symmetric components in their DAS
passwords; we use S1 to denote this “more probable” subset of unique DASJ encodings of C1-passwords
deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 12 (S1). S1 is the DASJ-related subset of Class 1 passwords, containing only those passwords
whose components are drawn in symmetric strokes.
Deﬁnition 13 (S1a and S1b). S1a and S1b are subsets of S1 that belong to Class 1a and Class 1b respec-
tively. More formally, S1a = S1 ∩ Class 1a; S1b = S1 ∩ Class 1b.
Preliminary user studies have shown that the temporal order has an adverse eﬀect on user’s ability to recall
a DAS password [Goldberg et al. 2002]. If so, then we expect that users will choose DAS passwords with less
complexity (e.g., fewer strokes). We believe that S1 captures the easiest (and thus most likely to be chosen)
ways to draw C1-passwords, although not all possible ways (see Section 4 for discussion of the implications of
this approximation). The details of how we enumerated the DASJ Class 1 space (or equivalently, graphical
dictionaries) can be found in Thorpe et al. [2005].
3.3 Class 2 DASJ Graphical Dictionaries
In Deﬁnition 4, we chose to deﬁne a C2-password to have at most c components; for our DASJ analysis,
we use c = 4, since this value has support from 2 cognitive studies (recall Section 2.2). We assume that
users will try to minimize the amount of temporal information to recall by drawing each component with
the smallest number of strokes possible; we make the simplifying assumption that this is 1 (one). Thus for
DASJ, we characterize a C2-password by the number of composite strokes. This leads us to deﬁne S2 below.
We quantify the relationship between the DASJ password space and the stroke-count in Section 4.2.
Deﬁnition 14 (S2). S2 is the DASJ-related subset of Class 2 passwords, containing only those passwords
having a stroke-count ≤ 4.
Our general approach is to determine how many DASJ passwords are of length at most a given maximum
password length Lmax, with a maximum stroke-count of X. Counting all passwords of length at most Lmax
follows Jermyn et al. [1999]. We modify their function P(L,G) that counts the number of passwords of length
≤ L (where 1 ≤ L ≤ Lmax is the password length and G is the grid dimension), to limit the stroke-count in
each password to at most X.
4. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF DASJ
Following the relevant parts of the attack strategy from Section 2.4, and using subsets of Class 1, we expect
that a DASJ graphical dictionary would be prioritized in the following order (see Fig. 11):
(1) S1b ∩ S2
(2) (S1a − S1b) ∩ S2
(3) (S1 − S1a) ∩ S2
(4) S2 − S1
(5) S1 − S2
(6) the remainder of the DASJ password space that does not fall into any of S1 or S2.
While we expect (as mentioned in Section 3.2.3) that our Class 1 graphical dictionary for DASJ will
include most C1-passwords, we recognize that some C1-passwords will not be included due to our deﬁnition
of S1. However, even if our dictionary only includes as few as e.g., 1
8 of the ways users would typically draw
C1-passwords, this would imply our approximated bit-sizes are oﬀ by at most three bits – not signiﬁcantly
aﬀecting our results. Furthermore, there is strong statistical support that our assumptions are indeed quite
realistic (see Section 5), and thus the above error estimate appears to be conservative.  13
Fig. 11. Illustrative (bit-size) relationship between S1b, S1a, S1, and S2.
We approximate the size of password spaces S1b, S1a, S1, and S2, individually (Section 4.1 and Section
4.2) and their intersection (Section 4.3). For illustrative purposes, we estimate example attack times for
exhausting each of these as potential graphical dictionaries in Section 4.4.
4.1 Approximate Size of Class 1 Graphical Dictionaries
To estimate the size of various subsets of the password space, many (equivalent) counting methods are
possible. Our deﬁnitions in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 deﬁne what DASJ passwords are in the Class 1 password
space. Section 3.2 deﬁnes which of these Class 1 passwords belong to S1. We detail counting methods for
generating these results in Appendix C of [Thorpe and van Oorschot 2005].
Table I gives sample results for S1 and the subsets of S1a and S1b (recall Deﬁnitions 12 and 13). Values
given are log2(number of passwords). S1a and S1b both show an exponential reduction from the full DASJ
space: S1b grows at an exponential rate of approximately 3.6 bits per unit increase in password length and
S1a grows at a corresponding rate of approximately 4.0, whereas the full DASJ space and S1 grow at a
corresponding rate of approximately 4.8. For example, when Lmax = 12, the size of the full space is 57.7
bits, S1 is 56.7 bits, S1a is 48.1 bits, and S1b is 42.7 bits. The size of the full DASJ password space was
cross-checked using a variation of our method (for full details, see Appendix C of [Thorpe and van Oorschot
2005]), closely matching the results given by Jermyn et al. [1999].
Lmax 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Full DASJ space 4.7 9.5 14.3 19.2 24.0 28.8 33.6 38.4 43.2 48.1
S1 4.7 9.5 14.3 19.1 23.9 28.7 33.6 38.4 43.2 48.0
S1a 3.3 7.7 11.6 15.7 19.8 23.8 27.9 31.9 36.0 40.0
S1b 3.3 6.9 10.5 14.1 17.7 21.2 24.8 28.4 32.0 35.6
Lmax 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Full DASJ space 52.9 57.7 62.5 67.3 72.2 77.0 81.8 86.6 91.4 96.2
S1 52.8 57.6 62.4 67.2 72.0 76.8 81.7 86.5 91.3 96.1
S1a 44.1 48.1 52.1 56.2 60.2 64.3 68.3 72.4 76.4 80.4
S1b 39.1 42.7 46.3 49.9 53.4 57.0 60.6 64.2 67.8 71.4
Table I. Bit-size of DASJ space, for total length at most Lmax on a 5 × 5 grid.
Each of the three subclasses of C1-passwords presented in Table I allow perceptually quite distinct classes14  
of drawings (recall Fig. 1). We initially found the size of S1 to be surprisingly close to that of the full DASJ
space; however, upon reﬂection this is sensible, as the only requirement for a stroke to be symmetric is that
it is locally symmetric about any axis in A (e.g., Fig. 1a), which includes the combinatorially large set of all
permutations of dots and lines of length two.
The smaller the set of reﬂection axes used, the smaller the corresponding graphical sub-dictionary becomes.
As discussed earlier, a reasonable attack strategy is to narrow down the graphical dictionary to a small
number of axes, or prioritize a search such that globally symmetric passwords (e.g., Fig. 1c) are considered
ﬁrst. When any single axis (or two) are considered at a time to produce globally symmetric passwords, each
result will never be larger than that for the two center axes, as the latter maximizes the symmetric area in
which the passwords can reside. Thus, the maximum dictionary size of such a variation would be at most a
small constant factor, proportional to the number of axes considered, of that using only the center axes.
4.2 Approximate Size of Class 2 Graphical Dictionaries
For Class 2 graphical dictionaries, following Jermyn et al. [1999] we focus our discussion on a set of results
for a 5 × 5 grid size, giving the bit-size of the password space for passwords of length at most Lmax (from 1
to 20) and each possible maximum stroke-count X. The full set is provided in Table III (Appendix A).
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Fig. 12. Size of DASJ space for passwords of at most X strokes (for a 5 × 5 grid and a ﬁxed maximum password
length Lmax). S2 (for c = 4) is represented by the thick line where X = 4.
Fig. 12 shows the eﬀect (log2) of increasing Lmax for a given X: the password space’s size increases
exponentially, illustrating the roles of both Lmax and X in the DASJ password space. Note that the left
ends of all but the line representing the full password space (X = Lmax) have been omitted for simplicity
– we know that the maximum stroke-count for a password of length Lmax is Lmax, thus any line where
X > Lmax will have the same value as when X = Lmax.
Increasing X accounts for at least one half of the bit-size (see the diﬀerence between the X = 1 line and
the full space line, when Lmax ≥ 5). The top line, where X = Lmax, in Fig. 12 shows what one would likely
expect from reading the original DAS paper [Jermyn et al. 1999] (i.e., “58 bits of security” against guessing
attacks when Lmax = 12). The other thick line, where X = 4 represents the size of S2. We suggest that S2
is more representative of the “eﬀective security” of unconstrained user-selected DAS passwords, taking into
account the entropy reduction due to user choice in DAS passwords, and assuming all passwords composed of
4 or fewer strokes are equi-probable. This graph highlights the impact of the number of strokes on the DASJ
password space; the size of the password space is signiﬁcantly smaller (40 bits) if users choose a password
of length at most 12, composed of 4 or less strokes. The password space still increases with longer password
lengths (as shown by the rise in each curve), but at a slower rate for smaller stroke-counts (as shown by
the gaps between curves). Note that for a ﬁxed Lmax, a smaller maximum stroke-count X implies a longer
average stroke length.  15
Much of the strength of DASJ arises from the temporal order in terms of the direction of strokes, and
more importantly, the order in which these strokes are drawn. This explains why increasing the stroke-count
results in large increases in the size of the password space: there are many more possible permutations of
these strokes.
A high stroke count for a ﬁxed password length implies a short average stroke length. This leads us to
ask: how much of the total password space consists of passwords composed entirely from seemingly unlikely
combinations of very short strokes, i.e., entirely of strokes of length 1 and/or 2? This is easily computed by
discarding those strokes of length > 1 (or > 2), and the results are interesting: passwords composed entirely
of strokes of length 1 comprise approximately 1
4 of the total password space, and passwords composed of
only strokes of length ≤ 2 comprise approximately 1
2 of the password space. Thus 1
2 of the password space
is already accounted for by passwords that appear to be very unlikely user choices.
This might be examined from another angle: how much of the total password space consists of passwords
without any strokes of length 1? Again this is easily counted, with the result that if users do not draw any
strokes of length 1 (e.g., dots) in their DAS password, the size of the password space when Lmax = 12 on a
5 × 5 grid is eﬀectively reduced from 58 to 40 bits, very dramatically increasing susceptibility to dictionary
attacks. We expect that many user-chosen passwords will not contain any length-1 strokes – and note with
interest that 51.5% of passwords in one large study did not contain any length-1 strokes (see Section 5).
4.3 Approximate Size of Combined Class 1 and 2 Dictionary
Figure 13 shows how restricting the maximum number of strokes, while also staying within diﬀerent subclasses
of C1-passwords aﬀects the size of the DASJ password space. All data shown is for Lmax = 12 on a 5 × 5
grid.
The triangle point on the upper-right corner is the total number of DASJ passwords of length ≤ 12 on a
5 × 5 grid. Again, this 258 value is the “security” measure one might originally have expected from DASJ.
Notice the triangle point where X ≤ 4 – this value of 240 shows the aﬀect of number of strokes on the full
DASJ password space. The S1b bar directly below is the intersection of X ≤ 4 with S1b; we believe that this
value of 231 is a better “ball park” measure of the amount of security DASJ provides.6
Fig. 13. Bit-size of DASJ graphical password space. Values are given for each dictionary, with a ﬁxed total password
length at most 12, with at most X strokes on a 5 × 5 grid (see Table IV in Appendix A for actual data points).
6In fact, this estimate itself very likely over-estimates security, as (a) it does not take into account other highly-probable (but
not yet known) “Classes” of passwords; and (b) within Classes 1 and 2, our assumption of passwords being equi-probable is
unrealistic, thus over-estimating password entropy.16  
4.4 Illustrative Attack Times
For illustrative purposes only, we estimate how long it might take to perform a dictionary attack against
DASJ using our predictive method and related graphical dictionaries. The exact time required depends on
implementation details. For this illustration, we assume that password veriﬁcation involves at least hashing
the entered password using the MD5 hash algorithm, then comparing the result to a stored value.7
Here the attack time is at least the time to hash each candidate password. We calculate two sets of
times: one for an attacker with one Pentium 4 3.2GHz machine, and another for an attacker with one
thousand such machines. It is reasonable to consider that a determined attacker could exploit one thousand,
or even one hundred thousand machines using a worm, to distribute the password-cracking load. Using an
MD5 performance result of 3.66 cycles/byte for a Pentium 3 800MHz machine [Nakajima and Matsui 2002]
(scaled to 3.2GHz), and a 512 bit block size, approximately 1.37 × 107 hashes can be performed per second
per machine. Given the assumed resources, the time to generate the password hashes is given in Table II for
various sets.
Dictionary Time to exhaust Time to exhaust
(Lmax = 12) (1 machine) (1000 machines)
Full Space 541.8 yrs 197.8 days
S1 505.6 yrs 184.5 days
S1a 255 days 6.1 hours
S1b 6 days 8.7 mins
S2 1.1 days 1.5 mins
S1b ∩ S2 2.1 mins 0.1 secs
Table II. Illustrative times to exhaust various entire DASJ graphical dictionaries (3.2GHz machines, 5 × 5 grid). The
time (in seconds) is calculated by: dictionary size
(1.37×107)×no. of machines
The tabulated time is the worst case attack time if the password(s) under attack belong to the dictionary
in use. An attacker may achieve success substantially faster if dictionary entries are ordered according to
their probability of occurring. Note also that if the target passwords are not in any of the dictionaries, the
attack fails.
Although entirely illustrative and heavily dependent on the assumed parameters, Table II highlights the
practical implications of the graphical dictionary size. Assuming that we want an attacker with 1000 com-
puters at 3.2GHz to require an average of 10 years to exhaust these dictionaries, the dictionary size must
be approximately 263. Referring to our S2 dictionary (stroke-count ≤ 4), if we extrapolate our results, this
requires Lmax = 23. This implies that for this level of security (and a 5 × 5 grid) in the absence of other
measures, DASJ users should choose passwords of length at least 23 to resist dictionary attacks based solely
on S2 – which would appear to detract from usability.
On a more positive note, some of the larger text-based password dictionaries (which are eﬀective in practice)
contain approximately 4 × 107 entries [Openwall Project 2004b]. One of our smallest graphical dictionaries
(S2) exceeds this number of entries for Lmax ≥ 9. This implies that even if users choose passwords in S2
(and if these are equiprobable – which admittedly is unlikely), provided the password length is at least 9,
DASJ may still oﬀer greater security than text-based passwords against dictionary attacks.
5. SUPPORTING EVIDENCE FOR S1 AND S2
Our proposed classes of weak gud-passwords were originally motivated by available information about what
types of pictures people ﬁnd easier to recall. In this section, we discuss two reported studies supporting
the hypothesis that these classes are indeed weak password subspaces, and thus that the proposed graphical
dictionary attack strategy is likely to perform quite well from an attacker’s perspective, at least for the
implementation discussed. We discuss limitations of these user studies in Section 5.2.
A user study of 167 students was performed on an implementation of a variation of DAS called Pass-Go
[Tao 2006] (see Section 5.1). University students used the system to access their grades for one course over
7It should be clear that this attack time could be signiﬁcantly increased by various implementation enhancements, e.g., see
Section 6.  17
a 4-month semester. The results were analyzed using S1 and S2 as proposed herein (based on preliminary
publications [Thorpe and van Oorschot 2004a; 2004b]), and a third class (recall Section 2.4.3), which Tao
deﬁnes as a subset of alphanumeric characters and well-known symbols. The study found that 40% of
users chose gud-passwords that fell in our S1b, and when no stroke-count restrictions were applied, 72% of
users chose gud-passwords that fell in our S2. Other ﬁndings of interest include that password creation was
increasingly diﬃcult (in terms of the password creation success rate) when more restrictive stroke-count
policies were applied (up to a requirement of 4 strokes), and that 41% of users created passwords that fell
into our class S1a (only 1% more than the 40% already in S1b), implying that global symmetry is signiﬁcantly
more probable than pseudo-symmetry (recall Section 2.4). This study also supports our expectation that
many users will not choose strokes of length 1 in their passwords; 51.5% of users had passwords with no
length-1 strokes. Tao’s subset of alphanumeric characters and symbols (under speciﬁed temporal orders and
lengths) was 35.9 bits in size, and 19% of users chose passwords from this subset.
Of related interest, Tao also reported having posted a web site where anyone could create and practice
Pass-Go passwords, and found that the results for this site (although yielding a study of smaller size and less
controlled) were in line with that of the longitudinal study of 167 students. Of the 57 practice passwords
created on this site, 37.5% fell into S1b and 67% fell into S2 [Tao 2006]. Also, no additional passwords fell
into S1a beyond those in S1b, again showing a preference for global symmetry.
Tao’s results are similar to that of an informal paper-based user study of 16 students [Nali and Thorpe
2004]. This study found that 45% of users chose symmetric passwords, two-thirds of which were mirror
symmetric (and thus would fall into class S1b). It also found that 80% of users chose passwords composed
of 1-3 strokes, and with a deﬁnite tendency towards centering the password on the grid provided (56% were
perfectly centered; an additional 30% were centered about about a set of cells on either side of the center
grid lines).
While it would be wrong to assert that these studies are indicative of all user-drawn password systems,
their results support that our classes (and predictive method used for generating them) should be seriously
considered as a viable attack strategy. We now discuss how Pass-Go maps to DASJ.
5.1 The Pass-Go to DASJ Mapping
In terms of the user drawing, Pass-Go may be viewed as an implementation of DAS, wherein the feedback
to the user is normalized to better reﬂect the underlying encoding. To compensate for the rigidity of
this normalization, Pass-Go allows for strokes to also connect to diagonal neighbors. The user drawing
is normalized to points on cell corners, as opposed to DASJ’s normalizing to points on grid cell centers.
This implementation design arguably addresses the potential repeatability issue in DASJ when users draw
passwords that are too close to grid lines and corners.
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Fig. 14. Mapping from (a) DASJ to (b) Pass-Go.
There is a one-to-one mapping between the corners of a Pass-Go-5 grid and the cells of a 5 × 5 DAS grid18  
as shown in Figure 14. The diﬀerence is in what strokes are valid; DASJ permits strokes between horizontal
and vertical neighbors, whereas Pass-Go also permits strokes between diagonal neighbors. Thus in Pass-Go
every point has up to 8 neighbors versus at most 4 in DASJ. This results in a full password space increase
of approximately one bit when the maximum password length is 12. The reason for this surprisingly small
increase is that the password space is dominated by all permutations of length-1 strokes (which do not
connect to any neighbors).8
5.2 Limitations of User Studies
It appears that the best (most reliable, and perhaps only) method to determine user choice and behavior for
a given system is to deploy the system under investigation in the ﬁeld, and study the results from a variety
of populations. However, as for most user studies, those discussed in Section 5 only apply to a particular
deployment environment, for a single user population. Thus, we discuss potential limitations of these studies
when applying their results to other deployment environments and/or user populations.
The Pass-Go system of Tao [2006] was used to protect course materials, including course marks. Tao
reports, based on responses from a post-study questionnaire, that 80% of users did not perceive this informa-
tion to be sensitive and stated that for this reason, they picked passwords that were easy or simple. Thus, it
is possible that if the system had protected information that was perceived to be sensitive, some of these users
might have created passwords they perceived to be“more complex”. Without a secondary study of the same
user population, it is unknown whether these users would have created diﬀerent passwords, and if so, in what
way they would diﬀer (e.g., more strokes, less symmetry, longer passwords, and by what degree). How users’
choice in user-drawn graphical passwords is aﬀected by their perception of the need for heightened security
remains unanswered. Also, there are diﬀerences in implementation detail between DAS and Pass-Go, such
as the use of indicators on the grid (in the form of stars and shaded cells) to help users navigate. We note
that these indicators were placed in a globally symmetric pattern on the grid, which may have encouraged
symmetric drawings. However, the star indicators alone did not appear to increase the number of symmetric
passwords; in Tao’s web-based practice study, which did not use star indicators, the number of passwords
starting at either stars or corners was reduced (from 68% in the longitudinal study to 39% in the web-based
practice study), but the percentage of passwords in S1 remained approximately the same.
The study by Nali and Thorpe [2004] examined initial user choice on a single occasion, and as such did not
account for the eﬀect of password resets over time. Thus, it is possible that if users had to remember their
passwords, they would have created (or reset) them diﬀerently. It is unknown how user-drawn graphical
passwords change in complexity over password resets. Also, as this study was performed on paper, it may
have resulted in diﬀerent choices relating to the input device; for example, in mouse-based systems, users
might be less likely to choose passwords with ﬁne detail due to increased diﬃculty to draw such passwords
with a mouse. The diﬀerences between user-drawn graphical passwords created on diﬀerent input devices
also remains a question worth independent study. Finally, the sample size of this study was small (16 users),
and thus may not have been enough to obtain a representative distribution of user choice, although we note
the percentages of users choosing passwords in S1 and S2 are quite similar to those in Tao’s study.
6. TOWARDS INCREASING GRAPHICAL PASSWORD SECURITY
There are many potential methods to increase the security of graphical passwords in practice. These include
password rules (see Section 6.1) and mnemonic strategies to aid users in choosing stronger passwords. Pass-
phrases, i.e., sentences that help users recall a password, are a text-based password mnemonic. An analogous
mnemonic proposed for graphical passwords is to create a story based on the picture(s) [Davis et al. 2004].
Any mnemonic strategy should be analyzed for new user choice patterns it may encourage; Kuo et al. [2006]
found that a 400,000 entry dictionary guessed 4% of text passwords created using pass-phrases.
Implementation enhancements for text-based passwords can also be applied to graphical passwords. Graph-
ical passwords that are exactly repeatable (such as DASJ), can be stored using a one-way hash. Hashing
algorithms with an adaptable cost (e.g., see [Provos and Mazieres 1999]) and that use password stretching or
repeated hashing of passwords (e.g., see [Halderman et al. 2005]) increase the computational cost of guessing
attacks. “Salting”adds random data to the computation of each user’s password hash, and thus if any users
8The diﬀerence is more noticeable in the space of passwords without any length-1 strokes; here there is an increase of 6.2 bits
for a maximum password length of 12 over original 5 × 5 DASJ.  19
have the same password, the hashes will be diﬀerent. Salting thus forces an attacker to compute a new hash
for each password guess/user combination, increasing the computational cost of guessing attacks against a
set of users.
Also, minor enhancements of a gud-password implementation can increase security (albeit typically at
some cost in usability), e.g., additional user-selected characteristics of drawings such as color, backgrounds,
and textures. The gud-password space could also be increased by increasing the area from which the user
can select a graphical password – in DAS, this could be achieved by increasing the grid size. Unfortunately,
in addition to possibly having a negative eﬀect on the memorability of DAS passwords, increasing the grid
size from 5 × 5 to 10 × 10 only provides 5-20 extra bits for convenient parameter choices [Thorpe and van
Oorschot 2004b]. Another method that might increase security is to use a form of “zooming in”, originally
proposed for image-click schemes [Birget et al. 2003; Jansen et al. 2003]. One grid-based analogy to zooming
in, grid selection [Thorpe and van Oorschot 2004b], involves a user selecting a smaller “drawing grid” (on
which the password is later drawn) from a larger “selection grid”. However, to have any conﬁdence in this
method, a (somewhat elaborate) user study involving a variety of implementation designs would be necessary
to determine how much additional entropy it might add.
Finally, our work can naturally be applied to create a set of gud-password rules as guidelines for users and
for use in proactive checkers. This rule-set is provided in Section 6.1.
6.1 Password Rules for User-Drawn Graphical Passwords
The impact of symmetry, a small stroke-count, and/or no strokes of length 1 as illustrated on the DASJ
password space naturally motivate the use and enforcement of gud-password rules. Given our knowledge
to date, we suggest the following as an initial set of gud-passwords rules. For other variations on gud-
passwords, stroke-count could be generalized to the smallest user-created units whose input order matters.
We expect this list will grow over time, as more hypotheses of password complexity properties are developed
and observed to hold in practice.
(1) Require a stroke-count of at least ⌊Lmax
2 ⌋.
(2) Disallow passwords having global reﬂective (mirror) symmetry (e.g., Class 1b).
(3) Require at least one stroke of length 1.
7. RELATED WORK
The security for a password scheme depends at least in part on its resistance to dictionary attack. To prevent
on-line dictionary attacks, Pinkas and Sander [2002] discuss human-in-the-loop methods; see also Stubblebine
and van Oorschot [2004]. One defense against oﬀ-line dictionary attacks is to reduce the probability of
cracking through enforcing password policies and proactive password checking. Yan [2001] discusses some
popular proactive text-based password checkers such as cracklib. To perform eﬀective proactive text-based
password checking, it is important to understand available text-based password cracking dictionaries and
tools (e.g., Crack [Muﬀett 2004] and John the Ripper [Openwall Project 2004a]).
Graphical password schemes proposed to date can be generally categorized as recognition-based or recall-
based. This categorization is also used by a recent survey of graphical passwords [Suo et al. 2005]. Monrose
and Reiter’s [2005] overview of graphical passwords provides a diﬀerent (yet similar) categorization.
One recognition based scheme using hash visualization [Perrig and Song 1999] was implemented in a
program called D´ ej` a Vu [Dhamija and Perrig 2000]. Generally, in this scheme a user has a portfolio of
pictures of cardinality F that they must be able to distinguish within a group of presented pictures of
cardinality T. Another recognition-based scheme called Passfaces [Real User Corporation 2004] requires
that a user select a set of human faces as their password. Similar to D´ ej` a Vu, the user is expected to correctly
select each of the faces in their password from a set (or sets) of presented faces. Story [Davis et al. 2004]
is a recognition-based scheme similar to Passfaces, but uses a variety of photo categories (e.g., everyday
objects, locations, food, and people), and the user is asked to create a story to help them remember their
portfolio.
Recall-based schemes might provide the user with some visual information which they may use during
login. Blonder [1996] originally proposed a scheme whereby a user is presented with an image; the password
is one or more clicks on predeﬁned image regions. Birget et al. [2003] propose a similar scheme in that the user
is presented an image and is expected to click on several points; however, the user may click anywhere on an20  
image and error tolerance is achieved through their “robust discretization” technique. Robust discretization
for this image-click scheme was implemented and studied by Weidenbeck et al. [2005]. Other schemes do
not provide the user additional visual information, such as those based on user-deﬁned drawings (the DAS
scheme [Jermyn et al. 1999]; see Section 3.1 and Pass-Go [Tao 2006]; see Section 5.1). All of these recall-based
schemes require exactly repeatable passwords (as deﬁned within each scheme), allowing the password to be
stored as the output of a one-way function, or used to generate cryptographic keys.
Regarding memorability issues for graphical passwords, Davis et al. [2004] examine user choice in two
recognition-based schemes, showing a strong bias in user choice. Jermyn et al. [1999] argue that the DAS
scheme has a large memorable password space by modelling user choice as those passwords describable by a
short algorithm. They also examine the size of the password space for combinations of one or two rectangles,
and show that this is comparable to the size of many text-based password dictionaries.9
Jermyn et al. [1999] suggest that the security of graphical password schemes beneﬁt from the current lack
of knowledge of their probability distribution; this motivates our present work, which apparently weakens
this argument. Tao [2006] performed a user study on his Pass-Go (an implementation of DAS); his results
support that our classes are weak password subspaces.
Relevant motivating literature on human memory is discussed in Section 2.2.
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This work extends and complements existing analysis and understanding of user-drawn graphical passwords
(gud-passwords). Our work demonstrates methods to create graphical dictionaries, leading to a viable gud-
password dictionary attack strategy. Although the focus of our work is the application of our predictive
method (Section 2.1) to create graphical dictionaries for gud-passwords, we believe that graphical dictionaries
could be applied to other types of graphical passwords guided by our predictive method and the question:
“What applicable information is available about human memory and preferences that is related to the user’s
task?”.
While one may question the likelihood of users choosing passwords within the identiﬁed classes of gud-
passwords, motivated purely by cognitive studies on visual recall, at least two gud-password studies support
that a notable proportion of users chose passwords that belong to these classes (recall Section 5). Combined
with our results, this supports that the proposed classes are weak password subspaces; in the largest study
of 167 users by Tao [2006], 40% of passwords fell within Class 1b, and 72% fell within Class 2. This provides
strong statistical support that Classes 1 and 2 form a signiﬁcant portion of the passwords that users are
likely to choose (in the absence of password rules), and are thus weak password subspaces.
Class 2 passwords are (to date) the weakest identiﬁed password subspace for DASJ, the original imple-
mentation and encoding of DAS. The space of DASJ passwords when Lmax = 12, restricted to at most 4
strokes (or alternatively with no strokes of length 1) is only approximately 40 bits. If users often choose
passwords with a small stroke-count, or with no strokes of length 1, DASJ falls easily to a dictionary attack.
Indeed, Tao [2006] shows that a high percentage of users chose passwords in our Class 2, and that over one
half of users chose passwords that did not have any strokes of length one. An attacker could also use this
knowledge to further prioritize a dictionary (e.g., within Class 1; see Section 4).
Our work quantitatively supports earlier suggestions [Jermyn et al. 1999] that in order for gud-passwords
to be secure against oﬀ-line dictionary attacks, password rules and proactive checking should be employed.
Under the proposed password rules, users must be able to recall asymmetric passwords with a larger number
of short strokes. Usability might suﬀer with password rules (in both memorability and repeatability), which
might in turn lead to other predictable patterns in user choice.
Greater eﬀective security might be achieved by gud-password schemes having larger subspaces of memorable
passwords, even if at the expense of a smaller full (theoretical) password space. For example, encouraging
users to draw passwords with more strokes might eliminate the Class 2 weak password subspace, if at the
same time some other means reduces the diﬃculty for a user to recall their password. This could be achieved
by e.g., disregarding the direction of strokes. A better understanding of the breakdown of what users have
the most diﬃculty recalling (leading to a more formal deﬁnition of gud-password complexity properties)
would be beneﬁcial to understanding how to strengthen gud-password implementations. Attneave [1957;
1955] provides some hints in his examination of memory and complexity factors for visual patterns. It
9Note that rectangles are a subclass of Class 1 passwords.  21
would be interesting to determine empirically how easy passwords from the proposed Class 1 and 2 are to
remember. Our work highlights the need for memory and usability studies to understand more about what
users recall best, and how to take advantage of the strengths of human memory to create more secure and
usable graphical password implementations.
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Appendix A - Data Tables for Figures 12 and 13
X 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Lmax
1 4.7
2 6.7 9.5
3 8.5 12.3 14.3
4 10.3 14.6 17.5 19.1
5 12.1 16.8 20.3 22.7 24.0
6 13.9 18.9 22.8 25.7 27.7 28.8
7 15.7 21.0 25.1 28.4 30.9 32.7 33.6
8 17.5 23.0 27.3 30.9 33.8 36.1 37.6 38.4
9 19.3 25.0 29.5 33.4 36.6 39.2 41.2 42.6 43.2
10 21.0 26.9 31.7 35.7 39.1 42.1 44.4 46.3 47.5 48.1
11 22.8 28.9 33.8 38.0 41.6 44.8 47.4 49.6 51.3 52.4
12 24.6 30.8 35.8 40.2 44.0 47.4 50.3 52.8 54.8 56.3
13 26.4 32.7 37.9 42.4 46.4 49.9 53.0 55.7 58.0 59.9
14 28.2 34.6 39.9 44.6 48.7 52.4 55.7 58.6 61.1 63.2
15 30.0 36.5 41.9 46.7 50.9 54.8 58.2 61.3 64.0 66.4
16 31.8 38.4 43.9 48.8 53.2 57.1 60.7 63.9 66.8 69.4
17 33.6 40.3 45.9 50.9 55.3 59.4 63.1 66.5 69.6 72.3
18 35.4 42.1 47.9 52.9 57.5 61.7 65.5 69.0 72.2 75.1
19 37.2 44.0 49.8 55.0 59.6 63.9 67.9 71.5 74.8 77.8
20 39.0 45.9 51.8 57.0 61.8 66.1 70.2 73.9 77.3 80.5
X 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Lmax
11 52.9
12 57.3 57.7
13 61.3 62.1 62.5
14 64.9 66.2 67.0 67.3
15 68.4 70.0 71.1 71.9 72.1
16 71.6 73.5 75.0 76.1 76.7 77.0
17 74.7 76.8 78.6 80.0 81.0 81.6 81.8
18 77.7 80.0 82.0 83.6 84.9 85.9 86.4 86.6
19 80.6 83.1 85.2 87.1 88.7 89.9 90.8 91.3 91.4
20 83.4 86.0 88.4 90.5 92.2 93.7 94.9 95.7 96.1 96.2
Table III. Bit-size of DASJ with diﬀerent maximum lengths and stroke-counts as illustrated in Fig. 12 of
Section 4.2. Values are given for total length at most Lmax with at most X strokes on a 5 × 5 grid. S2 is
shown in the column where X = 4.
X 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Dictionary
Full Space 24.6 30.8 35.8 40.2 44.0 47.4 50.3 52.8 54.8 56.3 57.3 57.7
S1 18.2 26.4 32.8 38.0 42.4 46.2 49.4 52.1 54.4 56.1 57.2 57.6
S1a 17.6 25.2 31.4 36.6 41.0 44.6 47.1 48.3 48.7 48.8 48.8 48.8
S1b 16.1 22.2 26.9 30.7 34.0 36.7 38.9 40.6 41.8 42.5 42.7 42.8
Table IV. Bit-size of DASJ space as illustrated in Fig. 13 of Section 4.3. Values are given for each dictionary,
with a ﬁxed total password length at most 12, with at most X strokes on a 5 × 5 grid.